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JUSTICES WHO CHANGE:  A RESPONSE TO 
EPSTEIN ET AL. 
Linda Greenhouse*
The growing recognition by political scientists and law professors that 
Supreme Court Justices can and do change while on the bench is a breath of 
fresh air on a subject that for much too long has been in the grip of abstract 
academic thinking and untested assumptions.1
My own interest was sparked by my research into the life and career of 
that paradigmatically “evolutionary” Justice, Harry A. Blackmun,2 as well 
as by nearly 30 years of covering the Supreme Court.  For nearly one-third 
of my tenure on the Supreme Court beat, there was no change in the Court’s 
membership, and yet clearly the Court changed between 1994 and 2005.  
Who could have predicted, for example, that Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist, the very embodiment of Supreme Court conservatism in the late 
twentieth century, would eventually be one of the dozen “trending to the 
left” Justices in Figure 5 of Professor Epstein’s paper?3  His place there is 
well deserved, despite the fact that I am quite certain that Rehnquist never 
actually changed his mind about anything that he deemed important.  The 
“attitudinal model” indeed!4  
Turning from the recent past to the immediate present, the paper also 
shines valuable light on Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.  He is commonly de-
picted as having stepped into Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s role as the 
“swing” Justice.5  But Epstein and her co-authors demonstrate that in fact, 
 
*  Supreme Court correspondent, The New York Times. 
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Kennedy has changed very little since 1990 in any doctrinal area, and that 
on the subject of affirmative action, still a volatile issue for the Court, he 
has never shown evidence of shifting from his view that government policy 
should simply not take race into account for any reason.  The paper thus of-
fers a valuable corrective to sloppy thinking and writing about the current 
Court. 
Epstein and her colleagues prove conclusively that preference change, 
at least among long-serving Justices, is the rule rather than the exception.6  
Data of the sort they compile, of course, go only so far, raising rather than 
answering the further question of why this should be so.  That is the ques-
tion that Robert H. Jackson posed on the eve of his own appointment to the 
Supreme Court.  In the preface to his book The Struggle for Judicial Su-
premacy, published in 1941, Jackson reflected, as a veteran of the battle 
over FDR’s failed court-packing plan, on the fact that “history shows re-
peated disappointment of liberal Presidents in their efforts to effect a per-
manent or even long-enduring change of attitude or philosophy of the Court 
by additions to its personnel.”7  And then he asked the question that re-
mains as pertinent today:  “Why is it that the Court influences appointees 
more consistently than appointees influence the Court?”8  Little did Jackson 
know when he wrote those words in September 1940 that they would come 
to apply with full force to his own Supreme Court tenure. 
The answer to the “why” question is not one that can be teased from 
data or charts, and I mean no criticism by raising it.  It simply points to an-
other line of inquiry, one based on insights from personal history and psy-
chology.  This Gestalt-centered rather than data-driven inquiry is 
necessarily anecdotal and more open to conflicting interpretations.  It may 
even be a question without a general answer, inviting us to look at members 
of the court in all the fullness and quirkiness of their individual personali-
ties.  Since none of us can ever really know another person, let alone one 
we haven’t met, this is a perilous enterprise—but an irresistible one. 
 It makes sense to suppose that an individual’s response to the awe-
some experience of serving on the Supreme Court will depend on a particu-
lar mix of personal and institutional factors unlikely to be replicated 
precisely, either across the bench or across time.  Based on my work in the 
Blackmun papers, I have suggested that his post–1973 development was an 
example of path dependence:  that being vilified by one side of the abortion 
debate and lionized by the other in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade9 led him to 
                                                                                                                           
practitioner, Thomas Goldstein, as explaining, “The basic principle is, it’s Justice Kennedy’s world and 
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become more and more entrenched in his defense of Roe.  As a result, he 
eventually came to embrace a unified jurisprudence of women’s rights and 
abortion rights that was almost completely foreign to the medical model of 
abortion with which he began.10  Blackmun was a brooder who took things 
personally.  It is hard to imagine Justice William Brennan sitting in his 
chambers at night reading through the tens of thousands of pieces of hate 
mail that poured into the Blackmun chambers.  Blackmun read all those let-
ters and saved them all; in their way, they helped make him the Justice he 
became. 
And how about Chief Justice Rehnquist?  There is no reason to sup-
pose that when he declared for the Court in Dickerson v. United States in 
2000 that the Miranda warnings “have become part of our national culture” 
and should be preserved,11 he liked Miranda v. Arizona12 any better than he 
ever had.  But his policy preference wasn’t the question in Dickerson.  
Rather, the question of the fate of the Miranda doctrine had become sub-
sumed into the ongoing struggle between the Court and Congress over 
which was entitled to the last word in constitutional interpretation,13 and 
preserving the Court’s turf was more important to the Chief Justice than the 
symbolic remnants of a doctrine that had been whittled away through inter-
vening decisions, a number of them at his own hand.14  In other words, 
Rehnquist hadn’t changed his mind.  Rather, a particular context caused 
him to change his perspective and his priorities.  And Dickerson was only 
one of several important cases in which the Chief Justice turned back from 
following the logical implications of his own opinions.15
Following Justice Thurgood Marshall’s retirement, Justice O’Connor 
published a tribute in which she described the experience of having sat with 
him at the conference table for ten years, listening to the stories of his 
amazing life.  By recounting his life experiences, O’Connor wrote, Marshall 
was “constantly pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the persua-
siveness of legal argument but also to the power of moral truth.”16
And then, in this little essay, O’Connor said something quite remark-
able.  She found herself still listening for Marshall’s voice, she said, “hop-
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12  384 U.S. 436 (1966) (link). 
13  For the contemporary context of this interbranch struggle, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, 
Protecting the Constitution from the People:  Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L. 
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ing to hear, just once more, another story that would, by and by, perhaps 
change the way I see the world.”17  This was a surprising statement coming 
in 1992 from a Justice whose jurisprudence bore, to say the least, little of 
Marshall’s imprint.  Recall that the following year, she would go on to write 
for the Court in Shaw v. Reno,18 launching a reappraisal of racially-
conscious electoral districting that would have enraged Marshall (and, in-
deed, this 5-to-4 decision, with Marshall’s successor, Justice Clarence 
Thomas, in the majority, would not have been possible without his retire-
ment). 
But “by and by” did, in its way, come to pass, in O’Connor’s opinion 
for the Court a decade later in Grutter v. Bollinger,19 upholding affirmative 
action in university admissions.  There is little doubt that O’Connor’s ex-
periences on and off the bench changed her profoundly.  She used her 
abundant energy to travel widely, interacting with judges of other constitu-
tional courts and working through the American Bar Association to advance 
the rule of law in the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe.  She opened 
herself to new experiences that, taken as a whole over a Supreme Court ca-
reer of twenty-four years, did change the way she saw the world. 
What predictions do these observations enable us to make about the 
kinds of Justices most likely to experience “ideological drift”?  The Epstein 
et al. data suggest that those who serve more than ten years (that is, nearly 
every Justice these days) are likely to shift preferences to some degree.20  
Lawrence Baum suggests that those who come from outside Washington, at 
least among Republican-appointed Justices since Earl Warren, will drift 
left, while those selected from among Washington insiders will not.21  
Looking at the same data through a slightly different lens, Michael Dorf 
finds that Republican Justices with executive branch service will remain 
stable, while those without it will move to the left.22
 By these measures, neither Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. nor Jus-
tice Samuel A. Alito Jr. is likely to change.  (Although Alito spent 15 years 
as a federal judge with chambers in New Jersey, his formative legal experi-
ences were in the executive branch, as an assistant to the Solicitor General 
and in the Office of Legal Counsel.)  On the other hand, both are likely to 
serve on the Court for decades. 
 
17  Id. at 1220. 
18  509 U.S. 630 (1993) (link). 
19  539 U.S. 306 (2003) (link). 
20  Epstein et al., supra note 3 (manuscript at 36). 
21  BAUM, supra note 1, at 144. 
22  Dorf, supra note 2 (manuscript at 12–15).  Looking at the twelve appointees of Republican 
presidents beginning with Richard Nixon, the six who had executive branch experience were Burger, 
Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito.  Id. (manuscript at 6–7).  The six who did not were 
Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.  See id. (manuscript at 8). 
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In his recent book, Private Lives, Public Consequences:  Personality 
and Politics in Modern America, the historian William Chafe presents por-
traits of national leaders from FDR to Clinton and tries to identify the con-
nection between the personal and the political.23  Most of these individuals 
endured some crisis that had the result of causing or forcing them to see 
things in a new way.  Chafe does not look at the Supreme Court, but there is 
no reason his observations should not be transferable.  For Blackmun, the 
crisis was certainly the trauma of his early years on the Court, including 
Roe v. Wade and its aftermath.  For O’Connor, it was the experience of 
leaving all that was comfortable and familiar in Arizona to become, over-
night, an icon, a figure of history as the first female Justice.  I’m not aware 
of a crisis in the lives of John Roberts or Samuel Alito that would have 
shattered their received notions of how the world works.  At least, not yet. 
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